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Theory of political parties as coalitions: comparative analysis of 150 parties in 35 European countries

Abstract. I analyze the results of comparative study of 150 parties in 35 European democracies. The aim of this study was to find out: (1) how party factionalism affects the parties' electoral success; (2) how party leaderships tend to resolve internal disputes and how it affects the governmental success, and (3) how the rise of right-wing populism affects the governmental ability to respond to the growing challenges of electoral turmoil. I draw upon rational choice assumptions that parties are coalitions of individual actors with their own preferences who build groups to maximize their influence on public decision-making and pursue different strategies to contest for party leadership. I argue that the middle degree of factionalism is favorable for party success, while the high degree is not, that is supported by empirical evidence showing that slightly factionalized parties are more successful, than those with high degree of factionalism. The results enable to formulate a conclusion as a theorem on joint candidate: If the aim of factions is to maximize party offices for minimal losses, then the possibility of joint candidate nomination by these factions is inversely proportional to the differences among party offices held by the factions. The future research needs to test the propositions and to formulate new theorems and suggestions.

Keywords: political parties; factionalism; rational choice; right-wing populism; electoral success

Introduction

Political parties are indispensable means for democratic governance. Liberal democracy and representative government are unthinkable save in terms of parties who created them [29, p. 1]. There is no linkage between civil society and state without parties and accountability is not achievable if there are no sustainable party organizations. There is an obvious need in comparative studies of party organizations across nations to know better, how parties organize, cooperate and govern themselves.

I analyze the results of comparative study of 150 parties in 35 European democracies. The aim of this study was to find out: (1) how party factionalism affects the parties' electoral success; (2) how

party leaderships tend to resolve internal disputes and how it affects the governmental success, and (3) how the rise of right-wing populism affects the governmental ability to respond to the growing challenges of electoral turmoil. I draw upon rational choice assumptions that parties are coalitions of individual actors with their own preferences who build groups to maximize their influence on public decision-making and pursue different strategies to contest for party leadership. I argue that the middle degree of factionalism is favorable for party success, while the high degree is not, that is supported by empirical evidence showing that slightly factionalized parties are more successful, then those with high degree of factionalism.

The database on party factionalism in Europe contains the interviews with 100 party leaders, MPs and or other key figures in a party, intellectual visionaries and influential policymakers, and information on their backgrounds, working and current activities. The special attention is concentrated around their vision of parties, judgments on factionalism and proposals on party organization as well as on important initiatives, essential proposals and positions on current debates. The database is also contains party programs, policy papers, legislative proposals, blog's posts and secondary sources. The results are coded by categories refer to textual data, pictures or photos, audio files and video fragments and occasionally added by quantitative datasets if necessary, including the data on elections, parties and voting.

1. State-of-the-art

Comparative studies of party organizations are essential field of party research, though there is a limited attention to intra-party and factional politics in party literature. In fact, the neglect of party organizations resulted in situation where political parties remain “the leprechauns in the political forest, legendary creatures with special powers who avoid being seen” [17, p. 319]. In spite of general recognition that political parties require special focus on party organizations, there is still no general framework for studying party organization and the lack of knowledge of “how political parties really work” [26].

The comprehensive quantitative analysis of party literature in Europe since 1945 by Daniele Caramani and Simon Hug (1998) demonstrates that only about 12 % of articles included in the database relate to the “organization of parties”. This category is rather broad and includes working processes within parties, factionalism, membership, activism, nomination processes, finance, ancillary organizations, leadership and statutes of parties. The database shows that party organizational research has been highly concentrated in Belgium (16 %), Italy (15 %), United Kingdom and Germany (both 13 %). Meanwhile organization of parties revived in the center of attention in the whole discipline of parties [14, p. 1].

However, the data on party organizations are limited in study of parties. In fact, “the conceptualization of party structure has an ad hoc quality, with little attention paid to creating reliable measures of party organization... With few exceptions, the comparative parties literature has paid relatively little attention to conceptualizing party organization and even less to measurement issues” [18, p. 171]. The relevance of party organizational research lies in strengthening methodological coherence thanks to the set of logically consistent and clearly defined variables and systematic data collection [6, p. 384]. Party organization matters, because party regarded as somewhat like a small political system where there is an authority structure, sub-processes for recruiting leaders and resolving internal system conflicts [10, p. 1].

2. Conceptual framework

There is a valuable theoretical framework of party factionalism in empirical literature, such as in Frank Belloni and Dennis Beller's (1978) important edition on factional politics. The authors define faction as "any relatively organized group that exists within the context of some other group and which (as a political faction) competes with rivals for power advantages within the larger group of which it is a part" [1, p. 419].

International comparative political parties project (ICPP) of Kenneth Janda (1980) contains four basic variables referring to factionalism: ideological, issue, leadership and strategic or tactical one. Over 100 parties scored on each type of factionalism on a seven-point scale. This study demonstrated that "the ideological basis was somewhat more common than the others, but all types of factionalism tended to be interrelated; e.g., if a party had ideological factions, it also tended to have leadership factions" [18, p. 174]. In other study there were tested the relations between factionalism, leadership and party change with a suggestion that "the burgeoning of theoretical and empirical work on party change should focus even more attention on internal decision-making processes" [15, p. 1].

Stephen Day (2002) developed a framework for factionalism in Party of European Socialists. He described four "streams" in the party, that are: (1) national party leaders whose "transnational" roots lie in the elitist genesis of the Euro-parties as "support groups" for party leaders, tend to operate in the national interest on the basis of instinctual inter-governmentalism; (2) the staff, officials and national representatives on the Bureau's/Secretariat of the party, tend to operate on the basis of instinctual supra-nationalism; (3) members of European Parliament (MEPs) who make up the respective parliamentary groups that displays both inter-governmentalism and supra-nationalism; (4) local actors/organizations/groups at the grass-roots level who seek to develop trans-nationalist practice via the democratization of the internal structures of the party and display a supra-nationalist orientation [8, pp. 10–11].

Factionalism also well studied in rational choice literature. For example, Daniela Gianetti and Michael Laver (2005) formulated a theoretical framework for analysis of party factionalism based on rational choice assumptions that parties are configurations of individual actors with particular preferences who bargain over resources of power and choose different strategies. The party discipline is regarded as "the outcome of a strategic game played within political parties, in which legislators who are party members respond to rewards and punishments determined by some internal party decision-making regime" [11, p. 2].

This sort of factionalism determined by the rewards and losses that particular Member of Parliament has if supports a specific faction, or rejects, or switches to other one. The equilibrium sustained until the preferences of a particular deputy would be taking into account by party leadership, so there is a situation of bargaining between MPs, intra-party factions and party leadership. There are also important case studies of factionalism in a comparative perspective, such as Jonathan Hopkin's (1999) analysis of the formation and collapse of the Spanish transition-era political party, Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD). The author demonstrates how factionalism may be both consolidating and disintegrating for party formation and development, representing an important challenge for party leadership.

The analysis of the current state of comparative studies of political parties in Europe demonstrates that there is a significant amount of studies both theoretical and empirical to make it both highly institutionalized and well researched. The progress is especially exciting taking into account as it was just couple decades ago like "more a uniting of a broad confederation of individual studies and research emphases with a tenuous relationship to one another than it is a highly focused, clearly demarked or well-integrated subfield of the discipline" [7, p. 138]. Now it has specific theoretical foundations, methodological tools, techniques of analysis and data collection, infrastructure and

institutional base. Recent years was productive for new advances in the field, and the development of the sub-discipline of parties can go further.

One of essential problems in comparative studies of party organizations is the measurement of effectiveness of political parties. What does it mean for a political party to be effective – this question is of common concern by many students of parties. Effectiveness is one of the most important parameters of any organization, and organizational effectiveness is core of the models and theories in organizational science as a basic dependent variable.

For parties the effectiveness understood as effectiveness of political role in democratic governance and organizational effectiveness. However the study of effectiveness of political parties “suffers both from inadequate guidance by theory and lack of relevant data” [31, p. 514]. William Wright [31, p. 514] noted two significant questions that deserve attention, the impact of environmental change on political parties and the conceptualization and measurement of party effectiveness.

Spencer Wellhofer suggested an important concept of “organizational encapsulation” which means “the elaboration of party sub-units to envelop as many of the day-to-day activities of the membership as possible” [30, p. 206]. The author described party organizational effectiveness “by a modified Cobb-Douglas production function where inputs are characteristics of party organization and output is the popular vote of the party” [30, p. 205]. Organizational encapsulation is crucial for party effectiveness, because the more effectively the party can encapsulate its membership, the greater success it would have in elections and a greater linkage it would provide between party organization and society while being in government.

The concept of organizational encapsulation is close to the variable “pervasiveness of organization” of ICPP Project of Janda (1980). According to Janda, “pervasiveness of organization” refers to party penetration into mass social economic groups representing politically significant sectors of the population” and “is measured by the number of major sectors of society represented in organizations ancillary to the party and by the proportion of individuals in each sector involved in the organizations” [16, p. 105].

Effectiveness of political parties is crucially important for their adaptation and capacity for tackling every-day problems of a society. Regarding party politics in Europe, one of important problems is a crisis of European social democratic parties that decreases the effectiveness of their organizations and reflects in electoral losses and lack of governmental coalition strength. Since 2009, European social democracy is in significant decline hence the socialist leadership as well as party members are searching for a new strategy to revitalize their parties for electoral campaigns in both national and European elections. The leaders of social democratic parties of Europe undertake some organizational measures for strengthening party organizations and making parties more visible for public.

Democratization of party organization makes leadership more accountable and decision-making organs more flexible and transparent. The reform of leadership election system to introduce primaries with participation of all party voters and open debates of candidates. This style of elections is more attractive for public and provides a linkage between party and public opinion. The new primaries system of party leadership election is increasingly popular among social democratic parties across Europe, for example, in British, French, Dutch, Danish, Portuguese, Greek and other social democratic parties in Europe.

The effectiveness of political parties is also depends on factionalism and party leadership’ capacity to consensus building. Factionalism in European social democracy classified in this study by four categories. (1) Reformists strongly dominate over the leftists, as, for example, in Slovak party Smer – Social Democracy by Robert Fico or Social Democrats of Slovenia by Igor Lukšič. (2) Reformists slightly dominate over the leftists, as in Hungarian Socialist Party by Attila Mesterházy or

Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement by Evangelos Venizelos. (3) Leftists slightly dominate over reformists, as in Portuguese Socialist Party by António José Seguro or Italian Socialist Party by Riccardo Nencini. (4) Leftists strongly dominate over reformists, as in Belgian Socialist Party by Elio Di Rupo or Polish Democratic Left Alliance by Leszek Miller. The strong domination been labeled as “80” while the slight one as “60”.

3. Theory

European party research draws upon the tradition of synthesis of deductive/formal reasoning with inductive/empirical analysis, quantitative methods with qualitative approach. Soft rational choice is especially favorable for political parties’ research, because parties are rational actors seeking to maximize their impact on policy formulation and decision-making.

The empirical studies of parties from soft-rational-choice perspective explore “the interaction between the demands of voters and the nature of the offers extended by parties... This literature has made significant advances towards establishing a common framework for theorizing about the behavior of parties, the preferences of their leaders, and the conditions which affect the formation of governments in polities with distinct institutional structures” [27, p. 13]. That is why the rational choice theory became “one of the more interesting scientific projects that political science has generated over the last 30 or 40 years. This is actually more like normal science than many other aspects of political science: there is a project, there are problems, there is a field that has developed over a certain period, there are unsolved questions and some general ideas about how these might be answered [25, p. 10].

Soft rational choice theorists assume that parties are coalitions where political actors conduct a strategic interaction seeking to maximize their policy impact for a minimal cost and competing for limited resources. This implies that political parties considered as complex organizations where individual preferences of particular actors transmit into collective bargaining under certain formal rules and informal practices, with particular implications for government formation.

The typical situation is a domination of a particular intra-party group that controls a presidency or has a decisive influence on party bureau, working groups or other decision-making bodies. There is also a situation where the presidency tends to avoid taking any side in a conflict due to prevention of party fragmentation or even a split of the party. Rational choice analysis is also favorable for leadership contest in a party.

One of key problems of soft rational choice analysis is if faction lost a game would remain in a party or prefer to join the other one or to create a new one. The institutional settings are important for estimating benefits and costs from the formation of a new party. There is a sort of literature that studied the emergence of new parties under specific constraints, for example, Simon Hug’s (2001) research on altering party systems in established democracies. It has five important implications for new successful party formation. (1) When new issues become more important, the likelihood of new parties emerging increases. (2) If the weak potential new party is a credible challenger, higher costs of forming a party decrease the likelihood of new parties emerging. (3) If the satisfaction derived from integrated high demands increases, new parties become more frequent and tend to be increasingly of the weaker type, provided the latter can form a new party. (4) As the established party becomes more vulnerable on the electoral scene, the likelihood of new weak parties appearing increases, as long as they are credible. (5) If the benefits for a weak new party increase, new parties become more frequent, provided the latter can form a new party [13, pp. 55–59].

Simon Hix and Christophe Crombez formulated a theoretical model of legislative activity and gridlock in the European Union [5]. The authors develop a game-theoretical model of European Union policy-making on the base of Keith Krehbiel’s (1998) model of gridlock that depends on two factors: (1) the preference configuration of the political actors; and (2) the legislative procedures used in a

particular period. The conclusion is that if the pivotal actors are close together on the center-left, the EU should move existing policy status quos in a leftward direction; conversely, if the pivotal actors are close together on the center-right, the EU should move existing policy status quos in a rightward direction. Simon Hix is a Chairman of the European Parliament Research Group (EPRG), which develops collaborative research agendas, sharing existing knowledge, expertise, and coordinating data collection. He is also a Chairman of the project VoteWatch.eu, a website that provides access to the votes in the European Parliament and general reports on voting trends in the European Parliament.

A valuable theoretical model of party bargaining suggested by Tasos Kalandrakis and Arthur Spirling (2011), who estimated the parameters of a reputational game of political competition using data from five two-party parliamentary systems.

The authors found that latent party preferences and reputations of parties in government persist with high probability across elections while more radical parties in opposition tend to switch to moderation; meanwhile there is some difference between cases, for example, few countries likely to experience more radical policies than others. This study reveals how political parties shed a reputation for being out of line with the wishes of the pivotal segment of the electorate [20].

The authors draw heavily on Kalandrakis' "reputational theory of two-party competition" (2009) where he analyzed a dynamic game of two-party competition in which party preferences are private information, exhibit serial correlation, and change with higher probability following defeat in elections. Kalandrakis concludes, "two qualitatively different equilibrium dynamics are possible depending on the speed with which the latent preferences of parties in government shift between moderation and extremism relative to the opposition". The author claims, "the radically different equilibrium dynamics that can be generated by the model suggest that in order to fully understand the nature of two-party competition we must further study the manner in which competition between different ideological groups is resolved within political parties".

In sum, there is a significant amount of theoretical propositions refer to party factionalism and intra-party competition. Ian Budge and Hans Keman [3, pp. 7–8] talk about "series of hypotheses or propositions each of which can be examined and compared with what the collected information on that point actually tells us. Taken together, such propositions constitute the 'theory' or 'explanation' of why and how the parties act as they do, and ... what they are going to do in government, under given circumstances". Thus, "we should not expect a single general theory to explain everything about parties. Instead, we should acknowledge the existence of coherent bodies of explanation for broad segments of party phenomena as general theory" [18, pp. 183–184].

4. Data

The specific of factionalism data is that this sort of information is hardly quantifiable and poorly amenable for calculation. The positions and actions of individuals are very fuzzy and vulnerable, reflected in ambiguous expressions, tentative remarks and suggestions, implicit implications and considerations. That is why it is more appropriate to use qualitative database for factionalism research, typically designed for working with textual, audio-visual, graphical and other non-numerical material. This toolkit is well-elaborated in major research software packages, such as Kwalitan 5.0., produced by Dutch Kwalitan Advies, the program that is well-suited for analyzing unstructured interviews, documents and reports, articles in newspapers, diaries and journals, speeches and addresses, not restricted to written material and designed for coding, retrieving and classification.

I use Kwalitan to collect, classify and analyze information on factionalism in 150 parties of 35 European democracies. The results are coded by categories refer to textual data, pictures or photos, audio files and video fragments. I prepare data for a retrieval using the special tool for making selections of the various segments that deal with a specific topic and other specific parts of the collected

material. For example, the individual file contains interview with a particular party leader, who proclaimed the alliance with some other countries or parties, coded as “alliance” and is complemented by other files refer to this alliance.

The coding is accomplished on each subject in a refer text fragment that deserves attention and conceptualization, for example, on the party programs, public appeals, leadership biographies, presidential addresses, electoral messages and legislative proposals. This database optionally added by some amount of quantitative datasets where necessary, including the data on elections, parties and voting.

In sum, the data on factionalism is very diverse and need classified into subsequent categories and sources of information. These categories include primaries statistics, leadership campaign reports, party congresses briefings, the secondary sources etc.

1. *The interview.* The valuable amount of qualitative data derives from interview of party leaders, MPs or other key figures in a party, who sound important initiatives, formulate essential proposals and take a position in current debates. The database on party factionalism in Europe contains the interviews with party leaders, intellectual visionaries and influential policy-makers, including information on their backgrounds, working and current activities. The special attention paid on their vision of parties, factionalism and organization building.
2. *The party program.* The parties’ documents, such as manifestos and programs, are important entities for evaluation of factionalism and policy discussions. The database contains party programs and supplemented by new editions and revisions of programs typically followed after the pre-electoral party congresses. The texts of the programs are the results of consensus in a party and thus they are an indicator of somewhat as pivotal member in a party.
3. *The policy paper.* The policy paper is a typical product of any party that strives to form a government or to make coalition with other parties. The policy papers are usually produced by party affiliated think-tanks or public policy institutions that prepare their proposals and projects for decision-makers. That is why the database contains the material of party think tanks, if they exist, or otherwise the drafts of the corresponding party secretariat or analytic staff.
4. *The legislative proposal.* One of the main units of analysis of parties is their legislative proposals that are the essentials of parties’ parliamentary work. The proposals included in the database cover the most sensitive issues of the national debates and political agenda in a referring country. It may be the matters of abortion, migration, law enforcement policies, environment issue and so on.
5. *The blog’s posts.* The politicians’ blogs is a new important source of information on politics and it is particularly valuable for party analysis. The data from blogs occasionally used to evaluate the current configuration in a party and its cutting-edge accomplishments. The facebook pages are also informative on party politicians’ political profiles and images. The blogs are instrumental in linkage between party politicians and public.

5. Cross-national study

Cross-national studies of political parties became a viable tradition in political science since Janda (1980), Katz and Mair (1995), Ingried van Biezen (2000) and other ambitious research projects. The comparative projects typically based on vast empirical data on party membership and voting,

leadership selection and parliamentary activities, party electoral campaign and government coalition building. Nevertheless little known about cross-national variations of factionalism in political parties, the varieties of their organizational characteristics and the specificities of internal conflicts.

The comparative study of factionalism in 150 political parties of 35 European countries tries to fill this gap and to know better, how parties factionalized and what implications it has for public policy. This research drawn upon rational choice assumptions that: (1) parties are coalitions of political actors who contest over public offices and policy outcomes; (2) factions are the instruments of transmitting individual preferences into collective decisions and policies. Factional politics considered thus in terms of individual preferences and institutional rules set up by party leadership, and the equilibrium maintained between formal arrangements and informal practices.

For example, the case of Estonia reveals that factionalism is likely to emerge in parties created from merging of two other political parties, such as Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica, formed in 2006 by the conservative Pro Patria Union and more liberal Res Publica. Then intra-party tensions are increasing as the new party comes to crucial policy decisions, when its conservative faction insists on value-based approach to state building while the ex-members of Res Publica call for more neutral stance to individual preferences and cultural differences. This sort of situation is typical for various young EU members where party-building of the center-right was often a result of the process of consolidating different liberal, conservative, Christian democratic and other tendencies around a common European agenda.

West European nations, on the other hand, demonstrated more stable dynamics and the parties here typically based on old cleavages and drawn upon the traditions of consensus-building and sustainable rules.

Factional politics are more common in cases of large parties, especially in the environment of two-party institutional rules, such as in France or Italy, and in the context of majority electoral systems. For example, the factionalism in the Union of the Popular Movement (UMP) and the Socialist Party (PS) evolved into the institutional form so that various party factions have their recognized leaders and compete with each other under certain rules. Proportional systems are, in contrary, more favorable for the more homogeneous parties because faction building is often resulted here in the emergence of a new party, for example in Denmark or Netherlands.

The institutional rules are favorable for smaller parties and independent candidates so there is no need to conduct costly factional competition in established parties instead of building a new party. For example, Naser Khader from Danish Social Liberal Party and Gitte Seeberg from the Conservative People's Party left their respective parties to join a new movement – the New Alliance. The party was successful in parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2011, gaining a small parliamentary representation.

Factionalism has special implications for leadership elections in parties that increasingly undertake American-style primaries with participation of all party voters that is more attractive for grassroots party members as well as for public.

This kind of leadership contest becomes a common deal in both Northern and Southern European polities. For example, it is obvious in Italian Democratic Party, which position itself in the same way as its US counterpart. In Greek New Democracy, where the loss of Dora Bakoyannis with rather centrist and social-liberal line, to more conservative and right-of-the-center candidate Antonis Samaras, resulted in a formation of a new party, the Democratic Alliance, which was established by supporters of Dora Bakoyannis.

The results of this study also relate to political outcomes of national governments in Europe followed from intra-party politics, candidate selection and coalition building.

For example, there is a certain group of nations with rather right wing and national-conservative governmental agenda, such as Hungary, Latvia or Estonia, and there is a group with leftist politics including such countries as Denmark or Slovakia, while the middle group contains countries with some centrist or pragmatic policies as Greece or Ireland. These political outcomes revealed from synthesizing data from factions, parties and governments in nation-states in Europe.

The research also includes in-depth study regionalist parties, whose autonomist agenda results in a special kind of inter-factional conflict between “gradualists” (autonomists) and “fundamentalists” (secessionists) and the leadership contest takes place between rather moderate regionalists and hard-liners supporting full independence.

I conclude how, when and why gradualist/liberal and fundamentalist/conservative factions in particular movements pursue different strategies to challenge incumbent leaderships or to consolidate their own ones, and what does party leadership changes imply for policy outcomes in broader political systems. For example, the election of the representative of hard line autonomist and strongly conservative movement impose a challenge for a political establishment, as it was in a case of Bart de Wever in Belgium.

Comparative analysis of Flemish and Scottish nationalist movements reveals that there are certain similarities between two main parties of related regions, the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) and the Scottish National Party (SNP). The right-wing conservative tendencies in both parties were especially strong after lost elections while the left-liberal factions usually predominate when parties win elections and gained an access to public office.

During 80s and 90s both parties governed by rather liberal leaderships and it was a period of electoral success, while 2000s marked by opposition and ideological reorientation of these parties with conservatives leading this process, and now both N-VA and SNP are essentially pragmatic, adapting their strategy to a situation.

6. Transnational study

Studies of transnational party system in Europe became usual in political science since 2000s. In an important volume of Delwit et al. (2004), crucial for the consolidation of Euro-parties research, the authors characterized it as an “autonomous field of study” [9, p. 8]. The valuable contributions made in this subfield during the last decade while overcome the difficulties of the first years of its growing institutionalization.

Political parties at European level, or Euro-parties, are relatively recent political phenomenon. There are seven Euro-parties bring together parties from most European states both inside and outside EU: the European People’s Party (EPP), Party of European Socialists (PES), Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), European Free Alliance (EFA), European Green Party (EGP), Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR) and Party of the European Left (PEL). Euro-parties are instrumental in fostering European cooperation and strengthening ties between European nations, providing representation and legislation making, conducting electoral campaigns, holding party congresses, bureau meeting, leadership summits, working groups’ seminars and, most recently, propose their own candidate for the Commission presidency.

European political parties are significant players in the European arena. For example, the European People’s Party (EPP), that is the largest and the oldest one, was founded in 1976 by Christian democratic, conservative and other center-right parties across Europe and now includes 275/766 Members of European Parliament, 13/28 members of the European Council including the President, and 13/28 members of the European Commission including the President. The purpose of the European People’s Party, according to its Statute, is to (1) promote and foster close and ongoing collaboration

among its members for the purpose of implementing their common policy at European level; encourage and organize unanimous action by its members at European level; promote the process of unification and federal integration in Europe.

European People's Party has full members in all EU member states except Britain, because British Conservative Party previously in alliance with EPP broke with the party to form a new one, Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists. European People's Party also has associate membership from non-EU countries like Switzerland, Norway, Serbia and Macedonia, and the observer members from Albania, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

There is an affiliated political foundation, Centre for European studies, the think tank of the European People's Party governed under the EU Regulation. The Centre conducts research and analysis, holds conferences, seminars and workshops, to publish series of monographs, analytical reports and policy papers covering all major aspects of EU politics and decision-making. The Centre for European studies has four main goals: (1) advancing center-right thought; (2) contributing to the formulation of EU and national policies; (3) serving as a framework for national political foundations and academics; (4) stimulating public debate about the EU. The Centre has an Academic Council, the team of research associates and international visitors who conduct research on current problems of European development.

The second largest party in the European Union is the Party of European Socialists (PES) that brings together socialist, social-democratic, labor and other like-minded parties throughout Europe. The party is represented by 175/766 Members of European Parliament, 8/28 heads of governments in European Council, 7/28 European Commissioners, including the office of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Party of European Socialists has full members in all EU member-states except Latvia as Latvian Social Democratic Party

“Concord” has an observer status. There are associate members in Albania, Serbia, Iceland and Switzerland. The aims of the party are: (1) strengthening of socialist movement in the Union and throughout Europe; (2) defining common policies for the EU; (3) growing influence on the decisions of the European institutions; and (4) leading the European election campaign with a common strategy.

Since the very beginning of the post-war European project by Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, European integration has been considering as one of the essential part of the European political agenda. How Europe should integrate itself, and if it should, became a matter of discussion between decision-makers and public in national and European level. Some were rather skeptical about European integration if one understood EU as a genuinely pan-European, federal-like and fully integrated polity with common government, legislation etc. The others were more pragmatic and cautious, speaking about Europe as “ever-closer Union” with gradual harmonization of national and transnational rules. The Europeanists believe in genuinely federal Europe, speaking with one voice in external affairs and transforming into real federation of states with strong parliament and responsible government.

Euro-parties research is a new emerging field of European politics [9, p. 6]. Despite many fruitful contributions, there is a lack of attention to Euro-parties' influence on European integration and public policy, so this sort of questions was obviously underdeveloped in existing Europeanization literature [24, p. 389]. In spite of growing attention to Euro-parties, the analysis of their influence on European policy-making has been in fact quasi-neglected [23], thus Euro-parties research has to fill this gap by focusing on party politics in the EU because it is “important in European governance” [9, p. 8].

One of important issues in Euro-parties research is an institutionalization of Euro-parties. For example, Oskar Niedermayer and Thomas Dietz developed a model for institutionalization of Euro-parties with indicators measuring the frequency of intra-party interactions. The first indicator shows

the frequency of permanent communication, the second one deals with party organizational development. Camilla Sandström (2004) applied this model to the research on European Liberal, Democrat and Reform party (ELDR), which is now the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), assuming that the use of common symbols affects the power-balance between the ELDR and the national parties [28, p. 160].

There is a variety of proposals on European integration in Euro-parties' programs, platforms and manifestos, and positions on the current state of affairs. The parties dispute over degree of integration, its prospects and challenges, the steps to resolving the current crisis. For example, the European People's Party is very enthusiastic about the European project, but more cautious about tactics of its implementing. It takes a rather gradualist approach by calling for a gradual progress towards a genuine "European Political Union". It includes the direct election of the President of the European Commission to reduce the democratic deficit of the European Union. The EPP is fostering a greater shared identity among EU citizens, developing the elections to the European Parliament into genuine European elections in the sense of having more real European issues debated, and to form a truly united Europe through membership or strategic partnership.

The aim of this research was to formulate the impact of political parties at European level on European integration, regarding the European integration as a party political issue and computer modeling for forecasting the scenarios of European integration.

The conceptual framework included the main units of analysis such as parties, intra-party groups, policies and resources. The results of computer modeling show that the impact of Europarties on European integration is the following: the most probable scenario of European integration (limited by the framework of considered factors) becomes a status-quo (44 %), lesser probable is the intensification of European integration (34 %) and the least probable is the freezing of European integration (23 %).

The results of the analysis of the impact of Euro-parties on European integration demonstrate the following. Strengthening the impact of European People's Party (EPP) increases probability of status quo, decreases probability of intensification of European integration and (in lower extent) of freezing integration, while strengthening the impact of Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR) increases probability of freezing European integration, decreases probability of intensification of integration and of status quo.

There are also other factors considered as independent variables in this study, including intra-party groups (Europeanists, Euro-sceptics and Euro-pragmatists), policies (Free Europe, Social Europe, Liberal Europe, Decentralized Europe, Green Europe, Fair Europe and National Europe) and resources (Political, Social, Economic, Ideological, Reputational, Organizational and Informational). The fifth level of this hierarchical model is scenario of European integration, pro-European, anti-European and status-quo.

The impact of each factor to the scenarios tested by moving the symbols of corresponding variables on sensitivity graphs. For leading parties, such as European People's Party and Party of European Socialists, it would be more appropriate to take a pragmatic approach, because in other case they would lost significant electorates. If they try to use more integrationist rhetoric with special focus on supra-nationalization rather than more attention to national interests and local concerns, these parties would be challenged by Euro-sceptics and it would be dangerous for the integrity of European-level parties during the election campaign.

Conversely, for middle and smaller parties, such as Alliance of Liberal and Democrats for Europe or Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists, it is more rational to take more rigid course, either pro-European or anti-European.

Rational choice models also explain why, when and how different parties merge or split. For example, the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists created in 2009 by British Conservative party broke up an alliance with European People's Party in European Parliament. The alliance of European People's Party with British Conservatives could be maintained until there were common European policy of both sides; when they failed to come to an agreement on Lisbon Treaty the Tories left the alliance and created their own one with some slightly Eurosceptic groups.

The common European policy may serve as a base for long-standing cooperation between European political parties, even those that have little in common, as, for example, European Green Party and European Free Alliance, the federation of regionalist, autonomist and separatist parties across Europe.

7. Research

Factionalism is an important independent variable in party research since Belloni and Beller (1978), Janda (1980), Gianetti and Laver (2005) attempts to conceptualize and empirically research this party phenomenon. Nevertheless, not much known how factionalism influence on party success, for example, does it foster party consensus building or becomes a matter of disintegration? Despite significant skepticism about factionalism during the past centuries, this study reveals that the factionalism may be an encouraging matter for party development, promoting internal discussion and more transparency in party work and decision-making.

In this study, I consider party factionalism on the base of comparative study of 150 parties in 35 European nations to find if there is a positive correlation between factionalism and electoral success. I draw upon rational choice assumptions that party factionalism is a consequence of individual preferences within the parties where party actors, leaders and bureaucrats make coalitions to win the power game for the authority. I argue that a middle degree of factionalism is a supportive factor for party advance because encouraging party leaders for consensus building and recruit significant groups and representations into the party's decision-making bodies, while the high degree of factionalism is not well for party success.

Factionalism is a rare subject in comparative studies of political parties because of the paucity of data on party organizations and general lack of attention to organizational matters especially in cross-national perspective. In fact, party factionalism was highly neglected in comparative research because of the different nature of factionalism across nations and its issue-based, national-specific and personal particularities. Nevertheless, looking at party organizations is much helpful for factionalism research because it helps to reveal some important factors that influence party developments, such as leadership selection process, internal norms and rules, discussions and decision-making, bureaucracy and administration, etc. All these factors are contributing for the study of nature of party factionalism across nations.

The main variable in this study is a degree of party factionalism that means the degree with which the members of party leadership represent the diversity of backgrounds, groups and visions of the party.

The party leadership thus may be: (1) highly heterogeneous; (2) slightly heterogeneous; (3) rather homogeneous; (4) highly homogeneous. The problem of party effectiveness relates with a capacity of leadership to adopt strategies for encapsulating different party streams into the framework of decision-making bodies. Once adopted, these strategies provide a base for consensus building in a party thus enable it to conduct an electoral campaign in a coherent manner and stable working in government.

In other case, the party becomes a target for internal critique and suffers from organizational discontent while being forcing to maintain coherence to implement party policies.

The parties with highly factionalized structures are especially fragile to adopt the long-term strategies due to a significant fragmentation of a party after the electoral campaign. For example, the Polish Left Democratic Alliance is in serious decline after series of electoral turndowns since 2005, when factional struggle escalated between more leftist and socialist wing of Leszek Miller and more socially liberal and pragmatic tendency of Alexander Kwasniewski. The party turmoil after a serious electoral defeat resulted in leadership earthquake with total downfall of previous leadership.

The opposite case is a highly homogeneous party with either no faction at all or too weak ones to contest leadership of a party. This sort of parties are usually have just limited success both in governmental and electoral arena, because of the lack of stimulus for intra-party groups to promote their own agenda on a party level and there is no chances for them to transfer their policies into decision-making authorities. For example, in a case of British National Party the leadership is highly concentrated in the office of party leader, Nick Griffin; therefore, all dissent groups in the party have to escape to join either national-conservative English Democrats or far right English Democratic Party.

The Latvian case of “Unity” party shows that the middle degree of factionalism is favorable for party advances as a driving force in a coalition government, but not sufficient for making the sole government and majority. The party leader, Solvita Āboltina, is in the center of party arena as a consolidating fellow for different party tendencies from socially liberal to rightwing conservative. Āboltina performs a representative function in a party on the international arena thanks to her considerable foreign ministry background.

The other role is played by Latvian economist Jānis Reirs who is regarded as a special liaison of the “Unity” in foreign banking and business affairs and particularly in the Baltic Assembly, taking a more pragmatic stance and is considered to be a consolidating figure for party’s technocratic and economic wing.

The academic wing represented by philology professor Ina Druviete who is responsible for party’s cultural affairs and in particular for strengthening ties with Nordic countries and their cultural area. This group represents the intellectual base for party’s ideological and political foundations.

The special role in the party performed by Valdis Dombrovskis, now the Prime Minister of the Latvian Republic, US-educated specialist with physics and economics background, previously chaired the Latvian delegation in the European Parliament.

Dombrovskis championed both economic/technocratic and liberal/conservative supportive groups in the party and feels equally comfortable with both national finance and European affairs. He is a compromising figure for all party streams as being regarding instrumental in Latvia’s economic turmoil handling since 2009.

The party’s “European wing” represented by Inese Vaidere, the Member of European Parliament (MEP), who is an expert in international political economy and foreign policy. Vaidere is a key party representative in European affairs and foreign trade, working as a mediator between national party leadership and European institutions. The wing presented by her upholds a rather pro-European and centrist line with slightly liberal conservative stance on economic issues.

Right-wing populism is a common field of interest by scholars of comparative European politics since early 80s. Today it is an established field, and there is a growing literature on rightwing populism across Europe.

The special institutionalized groups, such as the ECPR “Extremism and democracy” one, were created for studying this phenomenon. The new wave of right-wing populist politics emerged since

2009, when the path-breaking financial turmoil and global recession resulted in a socio-political turbulence in Western and Eastern European countries.

The consolidation of right-wing populism before European election – 2014 is increasingly obvious in recent establishment of European-level organization of far-right parties from European countries, namely the Alliance of European National Movements (AENM).

The Alliance's declaration calls for "the creation of a Europe of free, independent and equal nations in the framework of a confederation of sovereign nation states, refraining from taking decisions on matters properly taken by states themselves and the rejection of any attempt to create a centralized European Super State".

The Alliance is represented in European Parliament by nonaligned members, such as Andrew Brons, Bruno Gollnisch, Nick Griffin, Krisztina Morvai and others who were previously united in "Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty" group in the last EP term.

I analyze national-conservative, socially conservative and far right political movements throughout Europe with special attention on their organizational characteristics, ideological positions, parliamentary activities and electoral campaigns.

The research considers strategies and tactics of nationalists in regional, national and Pan-European level, their current debate and political agenda, leadership elections and factionalism. There is also analysis of recent breakthrough of some nationalist parties, such as Jobbik (Hungary), Golden Dawn (Greece) and All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda", and its implications for political developments of related countries.

One of the main question in this research is European policy of nationalist parties in Europe, increasingly incorporated into a public debate on European integration and the future of Europe. National-conservatives and other right-wing politicians highly criticize the present direction of European integration as going towards what they called "super-state" or bureaucratic entity that, in their opinion, concentrates power of sovereign authorities in the EU nation-states. They propose instead the "confederation of free nations" with slight international coordination and economic cooperation, that is, in their view, should replace the current Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties.

For example, the foreign policy of All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" founded on the idea of what it called the "Ukrainian exceptionalism". The party strives to achieve the political and economic community with the Baltic and Black Sea countries, including Sweden, Norway, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Bulgaria, etc. This community vowed designed for both political and economic cooperation as well as to save cultural and national identities of member nations. Ukrainian nationalists claim that the proposed community may be a "bulwark of European civilization" in front of the challenges from China and Islamic nations.

The similar community proposed by Lithuanian Nationalist Union that calls for a union of "Balto-Carpathia" by Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine and Belarus. Similar arguments made by Hungarian "Jobbik" whose aim is to integrate Hungarians into a single political and economic framework by granting a special status to Hungarian communities abroad. The movement calls for closer economic and political alliance between Hungary, Poland and Croatia in Europe on the base of common religion and cultural values. The economic aspects of cooperation of the countries with poor economic conditions expressed by the National Association "All for Latvia / For Fatherland and Freedom" which proclaim the urgency of cooperation between Latvia, Czech Republic and Hungary. The party gives a special attention to bridging the gap between Latvia and other European countries, that it considers instrumental in overriding current economic and demographic troubles.

The slightly different political line pursued by soft right wing and national-conservative parties in Europe. Their strategy driven towards making the European Union more flexible, national-oriented

and decentralized. These parties tend to unite with European conservative parties, such as British Conservative Party or Libertarian, Direct, Democratic in Belgium.

All these parties call for the reform of the European Union to make it more market-oriented in a style of pre-Maastricht era, Thatcher-like economically liberal and socially conservative policies.

The Prague Declaration, which is a principal program of this kind of parties, proclaims free enterprise, free and fair trade and competition, minimal regulation, lower taxation, small government, the importance of the family as the bedrock of society and effectively controlled immigration.

For example, Polish “Law and Justice” party seek to build a “New Europe” that is, in its opinion, is to unite newcomers of the EU with young democracies from non-EU countries under the Polish umbrella. This kind of Europe, according to the party, is to be strongly oriented to Warsaw and concentrate its efforts on building solid transatlantic solidarity system on the base of common values, joint commitment to security issues in Europe and common vision of Europe.

This sort of policies was highly prioritized by the party during its governmental office in the mid-2000s and now it strives to revitalize them in opposition.

The other national-conservative party with this kind of attitude is the Croatian Party of Rights of Ante Starčević, which strongly prioritizes the Europe of nation rhetoric and strives for independent Croatia in a “New Europe” in a sense of British Conservatives and their co-thinkers in Europe. The party considers unacceptable the participation of Croatia in any federal union with other states without direct voting in referendum. The Croatian Party of Rights also rejects any political or legal agreements that, in its view, are contrary to the “fundamental right to exist of the completely independent states”. The party, as its national-conservative counterparts in Europe, is staunchly skeptical about further European integration and federalism.

The rise of right-wing populism in contemporary Europe implies a great challenge not only for political establishment but also for basic values underpinning the European project since its very beginning in post-war era. One of these fundamental issues is a multiculturalism that recently obstructed not only by right-wing populists but also by the leaders of the conservative establishment, such as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom David Cameron, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel or the ex-President of France Nicolas Sarkozy. They blame multiculturalism for failing to integrate the national and religious minorities into a general framework of West European values and call for the issue of multiculturalism to debate for its significant reassessment.

I analyze the rising skepticism about multiculturalism along with growing anti-Islamic sentiments in political parties throughout Europe and the factors that affect the anti-immigrant feelings among European electorates and the right-wing populist agenda in some parts of political establishment. I considered the parties’ impact on anti-immigrant sentiments as a factor of electoral politics and strategies of parties in government and opposition. The results have particular implications for further research that would test the propositions and findings on multiculturalism and anti-immigration.

The important finding of this study is that the impact of parties on right-wing populist agenda depends of the size of party’s representation in legislative bodies, that implies that the larger representation the party has, then the larger its impact on anti-immigration policies.

It also implies that the parties tend to be increasingly anti-immigrant when their parliamentary representations are growing in size, because they seek to satisfy the moods of large segments of electorate. Conversely, the decreasing parliamentary representation favors more pro-immigration views and policies. For example, the British Conservative Party has a positive impact on anti-immigrant issues while the Labor has a negative impact on right-wing populism, i.e. positive stance towards immigration and multiculturalism.

This empirical evidence is in line with rational choice assumption that the party that increased its parliamentary representation would pursue to the pivotal voter strategies that are considerably right wing and conservative on immigration. That is why such parties adopt more hard line policies on immigration to satisfy the electorate, while the parties with decreasing representation are interested in keeping loyalty of their own voter so they do not tend to change their immigration policies. The parties with the same degree of representation in parliament without significant changes are likely to be pragmatic on immigrant issues, driving into pro-immigration or anti-immigration stances in accordance with the situation.

That is also true for middle political parties such as British Liberal Democrats. The latter promoted definitely pro-immigration policies before the election, but after coalition making slightly revised their earlier attitudes towards migrants. During electoral campaign Lib Dems proposed the new integration schemes for Muslims, launching the You Elect campaign with participation of thousands of Muslim activists throughout the country, but after the election there is a growing tendency of skepticism on immigration, especially among rank-and-files and local councilors.

The rise of skepticism about multiculturalism reflects also in pan-European level, where efforts are making to create a new anti-Islamic and anti-immigration alliance of parties including such parties as Dutch Freedom Party or Belgian Vlaams Belang.

These parties are striving towards internationalization of anti-Muslim agenda with strongly nationalist rhetoric and rightwing conservative stances. They proclaim a new Eurosceptic alliance of national-conservatives and other right-wingers who distant themselves from far right, and they also stand for liberal economic policies with strongly conservative and nationalist climate.

The challenges from anti-immigrant and nationalist alliances deserve special attention for the incumbent organizations and governments as there are increasingly significant numbers of establishment politicians who express doubts in multiculturalism and mass immigration, striving to revise these principal components of the European political agenda and discussion.

8. Results

Institutional constraints are normally not favorable for emerging party formation. That is why, for example, the liberal-conservative wing of Danish Venstre party with Søren Pind as a leader preferred to keep on moving on in a party instead of quitting it for joining a new one. The *Pindists* benefited strategically from opposing the party leadership inside, not outside, where they participate in an open discussion with some more liberal party activists such as Inger Støjberk and others who advocate on gradual-based approach to free-market reforms by combining them with traditional Scandinavian-style state-inclined economic redistribution and welfare.

The party leadership' strategic manoeuvring between two circles are typical in parties with consociation-like policies and decision-making structure and composition. That is why Jan Figel, the leader of Slovak Christian Democratic Movement, tried to relax the intra-party strains between highly conflicted groups of socially liberal and Christian democratic backgrounds. The tactics of suspension is the other tool for minimizing intra-party clashes, and it was undertaken by the Maltese nationalistic leader, Laurence Gonzi, who strives to achieve a compromise between historically suspicion-fully factionalized communities of Christian conservative and liberal nature in a party.

The formal institutionalized norms and informal practices are highly important in intra-party balance' maintenance. There is a real turbulence in some cases, where the party groups are considerably organized and not properly represented in a party's decision-making authorities. The vice-president of Democratic Liberal Party of Romania Teodor Stoloyan encouraged his group do not hesitate to fix its status internally in party documents so it would be a clear evidence of complex

consociation-like structure within the party to curb the domination impetus. This kind of competition is typically introduced when policies does not properly correspond with factionalized nature of parties and groups and need to be harmonized during an organizational reform and organizing regulation.

Sometimes there is a situation of group's downfall and bring off from party leadership. Green party of England and Wales reconfigured under the influence of liberal-centrist wing with Caroline Lukas as a leader. The party previously governed by the co-chairs ('principal speakers') where one speaker represented the left-socialist current while the other co-leader was a liberal one. The centrist current gained a total domination in a party that enables Lukas supporters to overthrow the leadership and to cancel the previous two-person leadership structure in favor of the one-person one. The intra-party peculiarities are also crucial for coalition formation and bargaining. For example, liberal-conservative triumph in Open Flemish Liberal and Democrats party over the social-liberal team of Bart Somers was instrumental in breaking the government coalition in 2010 and the new election afterwards.

The different strategies typically pursued by competing factions at the different intra-party levels, such as in a case of GERB, Citizens for the European development of Bulgaria. Tactically pragmatic supporters of Tsvetan Tsvetanov, the party's vice-president, joined socialists at local level to win elections, while conservative movement around a party leader, Boyko Borisov, gathered around conservatives and reformists as well as liberals in other right-of-the-center parties. The intra-party streams are comfortable to compete each other over the power in regional organizations while uniting in nation-wide campaigns and elections.

The choice between different tactical lines is also depends on intra-party outcomes in other parties: for example, the power breakdown of particular groups within the parties is likely to be followed by joining the forces with other weakening groups in other parties to establish a new political party that is to challenge the establishment and the rules of the game. This type of the outcome is highly typical for some social democratic parties whose left wingers are often cooperate with other left wing social civic movements and target groups, for example, the anti-war campaigns and grassroots initiatives. The good example is a cooperation of left wing Labor in Britain with environmental, pro-immigration and anti-war groups, such as "Respect" political party.

The same was obvious in Democratic Rally of Cyprus. Anti-Annan group who opposed the unification plan under the UN auspices joined the new "European democracy" party. Analogously, after the triumphs of Margret Vestager in Danish Venstre Radikale (Danish social liberal party) and Lene Espersen in Conservative People's Party simultaneously, the socially liberal and pro-immigration activists under Naser Khader and Anders Samuelsen joined liberally minded Gitta Seeberg from the Conservatives and created the new party platform "The New Alliance". This Alliance lately transformed into classical Western-type liberal party by Anders Samuelsen. The same tactics undertaken by Czech Christian democrats who quitted their party on defeating from the rival group of socially liberal activists and politicians and joined Karel Schwarzenberg's "Tradition, responsibility, prosperity" (TOP 09) party. This party was highly successful and joined the governing coalition after the election.

The other typical variation of this kind of tactics was used by Valdis Kristovskis and his supporters from the Latvian 'For Fatherland and Freedom' party to join the highly successful 'Unity coalition' with the parties 'New Times' and 'The other politics society' which is still governing during the crisis time. The intermediate variation is the opposition support of outside political movements as in the case of Dominique de Villepin in French Union for the People's Movement.

Meanwhile the group lost the power game not always leaves the party even when circumstances are good. The opposition group's strategy depends on the chances for winning of the other party in a general election. The Czech Civic Democratic Party after pro-European breakthrough in 2008 resulted

in marginalization of Euro-sceptics within the party, the divided opposition camps pursued different tactics – one of them, under Pavel Bem, supported the leadership contest within the party while the other preferred to leave the party in favor of the Radek Jon's "Public Affairs". Analogously, the liberal-centrist wing of Civic Platform in Poland left the party after intra-party losses and united around the strong leadership of Christian democrat Pavel Piskorsky.

Conclusion

This study surrounded by a theoretical argument that party success depends on the degree of factionalism. I argued that the middle degree of factionalism is favorable for party success, while the high degree is not.

The theoretical argument tested empirically and supported by evidence from study of 150 parties in 35 European democracies, demonstrating that slightly factionalized parties are more successful, then those with high degree of factionalism.

Factionalism is an important independent variable in comparative research that needs further exploration, because political parties, their work and success depend greatly on party organization and leadership. It supported by empirical evidence from studies on effectiveness of political parties, transnational party system in Europe, cross-national research on intra-party politics in European democracies, the rise of right-wing populism and challenges to multiculturalism. The related findings tested in subsequent research.

The results suggested that there are three kind of dependencies in intra-party leadership contest and factionalized coalition formation: (1) the dependency of joint candidate nomination from the party office control; (2) the dependence of party behavior and leadership from power holding in office; (3) the dependence of intra-party competition on coalition formation, intra-party bargaining and governmental office control.

These results enable to formulate a conclusion as a theorem on joint candidate: *If the aim of factions is to maximize party offices for minimal losses, then the possibility of joint candidate nomination by these factions is inversely proportional to the differences among party offices held by the factions.* This theorem drawn upon the evidence from comparative study of 150 parties in 35 European democracies and further experienced on the new empirical data. The theorem on joint candidate formulated in a 'soft' rational choice tradition that harmonizes empirically based, intuitive theorizing with strictly deductive reasoning of axiomatic nature. The future research needs to test the propositions and to formulate new theorems and suggestions.

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Теория политических партий как коалиций: сравнительный анализ 150 партий в 35 европейских странах

Аннотация. В статье приводятся результаты сравнительного анализа 150 партий в 35 европейских странах. В данном исследовании ставилась цель выяснить: как партийная фракционность влияет на электоральный успех партий, каким образом партийное руководство разрешает внутрипартийные кризисы и как рост правого популизма влияет на способность правительств отвечать на вызовы электоральных изменений. Мы основываемся на положении теории рационального выбора, согласно которому партии представляют собой коалиции индивидуальных игроков, имеющих собственные предпочтения относительно ключевых вопросов повестки дня и создающих группы, чтобы максимизировать влияние на процесс принятия решений, преследуя различные стратегии в борьбе за партийное руководство. Мы утверждаем, что умеренная фракционность способствует партийному успеху, в то время как высокая степень фракционности препятствует ему, исходя из эмпирических данных, демонстрирующих, что умеренно фракционализированные партии более успешны, чем остальные. Теорема о едином кандидате, которая приводится в статье, состоит в том, что «если целью фракций является максимизация правительственных должностей, то вероятность выдвижения единого кандидата данными фракциями обратно пропорциональна разнице в количестве партийных должностей, которыми обладают данные фракции».

Ключевые слова: политические партии; фракционность; рациональный выбор; правый популизм; электоральный успех

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